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Litigation over Prison Medical Services
AARON RAPPAPORT*
Introduction
On August 4, 2009, a specially constituted panel of three federal
judges issued a remarkable ruling requiring the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") to release
approximately forty thousand inmates from the state prison system.'
The inmate release order represents the culmination of nearly two
decades of litigation in two separate suits. One suit, originally called
Coleman v. Wilson, challenged the constitutionality of the mental
health care services provided in California's prisons. Another suit,
Plata v. Schwarzenegger, challenged the constitutionality of the
medical care services (apart from mental health care) in California's
prisons. 
3
The history of these cases reflects a general problem in
California's approach to policymaking: a tendency to adopt
emotionally appealing initiatives without the willingness to bear the
costs and responsibilities. The specific problem has been the
adoption of politically advantageous tough-on-crime policies without
accepting the ultimate consequences of these policies. The three-
judge panel's inmate release order represents a condemnation of this
sort of short-term thinking. More generally, it reflects a deep distrust
of the capacity of the State's elected representatives and prison
officials to do the right thing on prison reform.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law. The author would
like to thank Brian Hoeber and Nicholas Martin for their research assistance.
1. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67943, at *394 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009).
2. Coleman v. Wilson, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20786, at
*3 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 1994).
3. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351TEH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8878, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. May 10, 2005).
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Given the widespread ramifications of prison litigation for the
State, the California Correctional Crisis Conference sponsored by
U.C. Hastings in 2009 invited four leading experts to discuss the
medical services suits. The participants included: Donald Specter,
the Director of the Prison Law Office; Clark Kelso, the Federal
Receiver and head of the California Prison Health Care Services; Dr.
Lori Kohler, a Professor at UCSF and Director of the Correctional
Medicine Consultation Network; and Joyce Hayhoe, Assistant
Secretary of the Office of Legislation at the CDCR. The panel
discussion occurred a little more than a month after the three-judge
panel issued its tentative order to release prison inmates and several
months before the court's final order was issued in August.
This introductory essay provides some background on the two
cases at the heart of the litigation, offers a preliminary evaluation of
the final inmate release order, and adds some final comments about
the possibility of long-term prison reform. Part One suggests that the
order was necessary and appropriate given the State's inability or
refusal to take meaningful steps towards remedying serious and
persistent constitutional violations. Part Two contends that the
opinion is well-reasoned and should withstand several challenges the
State will likely bring on appeal. Finally, Part Three concludes that,
despite the significant potential impact of the inmate release order,
the prospect of long-term reform in California's prison system
remains, sadly, dim.
I. Prison Litigation and Its Critics
Inmate release orders are problematic remedies because they
embroil the judiciary in penal policy, an area long thought the
province of the legislature. Not surprisingly, the federal courts'
intervention in the prison system has triggered heated reactions.
Government officials have argued that the courts have been too quick
to intervene, have undermined democratic principles, and have
unnecessarily compromised public safety.4 In this section, I contend
4. See, e.g., Malia Wollan, California Asks Removal of Prison Overseer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 2009, at A 18 (quoting Attorney General Jerry Brown declaring that the receiver has become
"a parallel government, operating virtually in secret, not accountable, not subject to public
scrutiny," who "feels he has unchecked authority to ride roughshod over the State of California
and its officials"); Matthew Cate, Letter to the Editor, Re "Shame of the prisons, " editorial,
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that these criticisms are largely unfounded. A quick review of the
two cases suggests that the federal courts have been quite cautious -
arguably too cautious - in intervening to address flagrant
constitutional violations.
A. Serious and Persistent Constitutional Violations
The Eighth Amendment requires states to provide at least
minimally adequate health care for their inmates. In both Coleman
and Plata, federal district courts found serious, even egregious,
constitutional violations of this minimum standard of care. The
Plata case offered an illustration of how dire the situation has
become. Several years into the litigation - after the state agreed to
make changes to the system - the Court's experts reported on the
state of care in the prison system. Judge Thelton Henderson, who
presided over the Plata case, described the results:
The report was shocking. The experts reported that they
observed widespread evidence of medical malpractice and
neglect. When they attempted to review a backlog of 193
death records, the experts encountered prisons where records
could not even be located. Among the records they were able
to review, the experts found 34 of the deaths highly
problematic, with multiple instances of incompetence,
indifference, neglect, and even cruelty by medical staff.
5
Moreover, the report found that "[m]any of the [prison]
physicians have prior criminal charges, have had privileges revoked
from hospitals, or have mental health related problems," 6 and
"[e]xpert review of prisoner deaths in the CDCR shows repeated
gross departures from even minimal standards of care."7 Findings
such as these continue in excruciating detail for nearly fifty pages.
February 12, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at A16 ("A mass release of felons would compromise
public safety . . . . It is time to turn control of the prison system back to those who are
accountable to the people of California.").
5. Plata, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8878, at *7.
6. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351TEH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43796, at *15
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005).
7. Id. at *20.
Winter 20 10]
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Following this report, the court decided to visit one of the prisons
to gain a first-hand view of the conditions. The court toured San
Quentin State Prison on February 10, 2005, one year after the prison
was supposed to have achieved compliance with the minimum
standards of care. 8 The result of the tour was horrifying. The court
explained:
The physical conditions in many CDCR clinics are
completely inadequate for the provision of medical care.
Many clinics do not meet basic sanitation standards.
... For example, the main medical examining room lacked
any means of sanitation - there was no sink and no alcohol
gel - where roughly one hundred men per day undergo
medical screening, and the Court observed that the dentist
neither washed his hands nor changed his gloves after
treating patients into whose mouths he had placed his hands.
9
Judge Henderson concluded: "[I]t is an uncontested fact that, on
average, an inmate in one of California's prisons needlessly dies
every six to seven days due to constitutional deficiencies in the
CDCR's medical delivery system."''
0
Recent studies indicate that serious deficiencies remain. In his
presentation, Donald Specter described a report of the receiver,
which analyzed 395 prisoner deaths during 2007.11 The report found
234 cases that involved an extreme departure from community
8. Plata, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8878, at *8.
9. Plata, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43796, at *41-42. The report continued:
[The Outpatient Housing Unit] was in deplorable condition. The cells
were dirty, the nursing station is beyond sight or sound of the cells, and
there is no examination room on the unit so that examinations are often
performed on the cell floors or even through the food slots.
The pharmacy was in almost complete disarray (with unlabeled
cardboard boxes piled in no particular order, antiquated and dirty computers,
wiring suspended like a drunken spider's web, and extremely frustrated
nurses and technicians), and there was an obvious shortage of medical
supervisory and line staff.
Plata, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8878, at *9-10.
10. Plata, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43796, at *3.
11. Donald Specter, Director, Prison Law Office, Presentation at the California Correctional
Crisis Conference (Mar. 19, 2009).
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standards of care. In other words, nearly sixty percent of the patients
were given substandard care. Moreover, of the 395 deaths, sixty-
eight (approximately seventeen percent) were deemed "preventable"
or "possibly preventable." In this group, the report found 120
separate lapses in care. 12  The constitutional violations found in
Plata, in other words, represented serious and widespread departures
from proper care.
The Coleman case found similarly severe violations, though
Judge Lawrence Karlton's opinions were less dramatic and graphic.
According to Judge Karlton, the State had no "systematic program
for screening and evaluating inmates for mental illness."' As a
result, "thousands of inmates suffering from mental illness [went]
either undetected, untreated, or both.' 4  Similarly, basic care was
wholly inadequate. The court found persistent and extensive "delays
in access to necessary mental health care," which in some prisons
reached a "crisis level."1 5 This was partly due to the fact that the
CDCR was "significantly and chronically understaffed in the area of
mental health care services."'
6
Where services were offered, they were frequently substandard.
For example, medication was haphazardly distributed, and the court
found serious problems in record keeping, "'including disorganized,
untimely and incomplete filing of medical records, insufficient
charting, and incomplete or nonexistent treatment plans at most
prisons."' 17  Additionally, "inmates [were] typically transferred
between prisons without even such medical records as might
exist."' 18 Moreover, the prison system had no means to identify or
12. KENT IMAI, ANALYSIS OF YEAR 2007 DEATH REVIEWS 12-13 (Nov. 3, 2008), available
at http://www.cprinc.org/docs/resources/OTRES-Analysis-of Year_2007_DeathReviews_
200081103.pdf.
13. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67943, at *73 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (quoting Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1305
(E.D. Cal. 1995)).
14. Id. at *73-74 (quoting Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1306). As an indication of how little
attention was focused on the issue, Judge Karlton noted that the government estimated that only
three percent to four percent of the prison population suffered from a serious mental illness.
However, experts ultimately determined that "the number of prisoners having an Axis I mental
condition and thus requiring treatment was ... closer to twenty percent." Honorable Lawrence
Karlton, Speech at the California Correctional Crisis Conference (Mar. 20, 2009).
15. Coleman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67943, at *73 (quoting Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at
1309).
16. Id. at *75 (quoting Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1307).
17. Id. at *74 (quoting Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1314).
18. Id.
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correct these defects because it had no "quality assurance" program
to ensure the competence of their mental health care staff and the
adequacy of the services. 9
These kinds of findings led the Coleman court to conclude that
California prisons lacked the "basic, essentially common sense,
components of a minimally adequate prison mental health care
delivery system," including "proper screening; timely access to
appropriate levels of care; an adequate medical record system; proper
administration of psychotropic medication; competent staff in
sufficient numbers; and a basic suicide prevention program."
20
B. Cautious - Perhaps Too Cautious - Approach
With these significant constitutional violations at issue, the
question was not whether the federal courts would intervene, but
how they would intervene. On first impression, the court's inmate
release order seems to reflect the efforts of "activist" judges, moving
aggressively to impose their own ambitious policies on the
democratically elected branches. In fact, the court's actions were
anything but rash or imprudent. Given the history of the two cases,
the federal courts have acted with excessive caution.
These cases have long histories. Coleman was filed nearly two
decades ago in 1991, which is why Judge Karlton noted in his
keynote speech that the case was initially designated as Coleman v.
Wilson (after Governor Pete Wilson). It took the court five years to
conclude that the mental health services in the California prison
system were constitutionally insufficient. Rather than rushing to
release prisoners, the court spent the next fourteen years trying to
encourage, urge, cajole, and coerce the State to take appropriate
remedial steps.
All told, Judge Karlton issued more than seventy remedial orders
directing improvements in the mental health system. 22  With
19. Id. at *75 (quoting Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1308).
20. Id. at *75 (quoting Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1298).
21. Id. at *71 ("[I]n June 1994 the magistrate judge found that defendants' delivery of
mental health care to class members violated the Eighth Amendment. On September 13, 1995,
the district court adopted the magistrate judge's decision, with modifications.").
22. Id. at *70 ("After fourteen years of remedial efforts under the supervision of a special
master and well over seventy orders by the Coleman court, the California prison system still
cannot provide thousands of mentally ill inmates with constitutionally adequate mental health
[Vol. 7
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repeated state intransigence, Judge Karlton ultimately appointed a
special master to provide recommendations on how to fix the system.
Due to the court's continuing oversight, some progress was been
made in fixing the mental health system. Nonetheless, as Judge
Karlton noted, progress has been inconsistent and ultimately
unsatisfactory.
23
In his luncheon speech, Judge Karlton lamented that nearly two
decades into the suit, he is still being forced to issue remedial orders
to require the state to construct a sufficient number of beds to care
for mental health patients. Donald Specter, in his presentation, noted
the State's seemingly passive-aggressive efforts to forestall reform.
After 2006, the State agreed it would be better to let the receiver
handle the construction of the new bed plan, since the receiver could
act more quickly and efficiently. However, as Specter noted, even
before the receiver could act, the State "went to court to actually
block the receiver from constructing the very beds that they agreed
were necessary. 24
When Judge Karlton responded by asking the State for its plan to
construct the beds, State attorneys asked for several weeks to devise
a plan, and then asked for a further ninety day extension. Judge
Karlton was furious, stating it was incomprehensible that after
fourteen years, the State still did not have a bed plan. According to
Donald Specter, Judge Karlton declared that the State demonstrated
"an unacceptable lack of commitment to its constitutional duty much
less towards this court."
25
The Plata case offered a similar story of State stonewalling.
Although it has been in litigation a shorter time, the Plata court has
faced an even greater degree of state intransigence. After the
plaintiffs filed suit in 2001, the State ultimately agreed to a stipulated
settlement that required it to adopt comprehensive reform of its
care, and critically mentally ill inmates [are] languishing in horrific conditions without access to
immediate necessary mental health care.") (internal quotation omitted).
23. Karlton, supra note 14 ("Perhaps it suffices to say that through the years and a variety
of governors and prison administrators, progress has been made in each of the areas of deficiency,
but no institution has yet met the minimum standards, nor have any of the deficiencies been fully
satisfied.").
24. Specter, supra note 11.
25. Id. In his luncheon speech at the California Correctional Crisis Conference, Judge
Karlton was much more restrained, simply noting that "just recently, I held a hearing dealing with
the failure of the state to have a viable 'bed plan' for members of the Coleman class needing beds
separate from the general population." Karlton, supra note 14.
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medical policies and procedures at all institutions.26 The plan was to
be implemented on a staggered basis. Seven prisons would
implement changes in 2003, with five additional prisons
implementing changes each succeeding year until all thirty-three
prisons were rehabilitated.27 The State also "agreed to the
appointment of medical and nursing experts," to advise the court on
the progress of the reforms.28
Despite these pledges, when the court reviewed the State's
progress in 2004, it found that not a single prison had successfully
implemented the plan.29  "Even more disturbing, the court experts
submitted a report on July 16, 2004 which found an 'emerging
pattern of inadequate and seriously deficient physician quality in
CDC facilities,"' such as a retired surgeon that continually made
serious life-threatening mistakes. 30  "The Report also identified
various systemic problems, including inadequate peer review and the
need for greater centralization of physician supervision, credentialing
and discipline."
31
A 2005 report on conditions at San Quentin was equally
damning. The report noted "'multiple instances of incompetence,
indifference, cruelty, and neglect.,, 32 In a review often deaths at the
prison, experts noted .'serious problems [in medical treatment]; most
deaths were preventable .... Routine medical care [was] replete
with numerous errors.'
33
Facing continued foot-dragging by the State, Judge Henderson
initiated proceedings to determine whether to place the entire prison
medical system in receivership. On June 30, 2005, after holding six
days of hearings, the Plata court ruled that it would appoint a
receiver. As Judge Henderson himself stated, this was "the largest
26. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351TEH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43796, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005).
27. Id. at 5.
28. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67943, at *51 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009).
29. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351TEH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8878, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. May 10, 2005).
30. Id. (quoting July 16, 2004 Report (part 2) at 1).
31. Id.
32. Coleman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67943, at *54 (quoting Apr. 8, 2005 Medical Experts'
Report on San Quentin, at 13 (filed in Plata on May 10, 2005)).
33. Id.
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federal takeover of a state prison medical care system in our
country's history."
' 34
Appointing a receiver, the court acknowledged, "is a drastic
measure." 35 Unlike a special master, who serves as an advisor to the
court (and lacks the same kind of independent decision-making
power), a receiver is placed within the state bureaucracy. The
receiver is authorized by the court to make whatever changes he or
she deems appropriate to bring the system into compliance with
constitutional norms. And the receiver need not ask the court for
approval each time he or she acts. That means the receiver can hire
or fire staff, reorganize an agency, and even demand funds from the
state treasury. Moreover, the receiver's authority is derived from the
federal courts and the U.S. Constitution, thereby giving it the power
to ignore or suspend state law. 36
Using the full power of the office, the first receiver, Robert
Sillen, moved aggressively to reform the state prison bureaucracy,
threatening state officials with serious repercussions if they did not
comply with his orders. When the State refused to fund certain
prison construction projects, Sillen declared that if the state did not
act soon, he would drive a van to the state treasury and start loading
money into the back.37 In January 2008, Robert Sillen was replaced
by Clark Kelso, the current receiver (and one of the presenters on the
medical services panel).
Judge Henderson's decision to appoint a receiver was not an easy
one. 38 Even Judge Karlton, who oversaw Coleman, expressed some
34. Thelton Henderson, Confronting the Crisis of California Prisons Symposium Keynote
Address: Confronting the Crisis of California Prisons, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008). The first
receiver, Robert Sillen, began work on April 17, 2006. He was replaced in January 2008 by
Clark Kelso, the current receiver.
35. Coleman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67943, at *66 (quoting Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No.
C01-1351TEH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43796, at *91).
36. In July 2008, during the budget crisis, Governor Schwarzenegger temporarily required
all state employees to receive the minimum wage. To the Governor's apparent dismay, the
receiver refused to obey the order, citing the receiver's overriding legal authority. See, e.g., Jon
Ortiz, Kelso: Keep Your Chin Up, SACRAMENTO BEE STATE WORKER, July 25, 2008,
http://www.sacbee.com/static/weblogs/the-state- worker/2008/07/kelso-keep-your-chin-up.htm.
37. Charles Piller, Prison Medical Plan May Far Exceed Need, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar.
15, 2009, at Al ("[Sillen] began the colossal reclamation project with vigor and toughness. Sillen
once threatened to back up a Brink's truck to state coffers to collect what the receivership was
owed. That confrontational posture was widely regarded as his undoing.").
38. Plata, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43796, at *91 ("[T]he imposition of a Receivership is a
drastic measure. But it is not a measure that the Court has sought, nor is it one that the Court
relishes. Rather, the Court is simply at the end of the road with nowhere else to turn.").
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unease about the Plata court's use of a receiver, rather than a special
master.39  Nonetheless, Judge Henderson's decision to appoint a
receiver is understandable. Judge Henderson knew about the
extraordinary delays occurring in Coleman, and he may have
determined that a special master would be no more effective in
reforming the medical system than it was in reforming the mental
health care system. Indeed, the State admitted to Judge Henderson
that it lacked the leadership and capabilities to improve the medical
care system on its own and that it could not respond to court edicts
consistently and effectively.4 °
However one feels about the wisdom of placing the medical
system in receivership, the appointment of the receiver did not
significantly change the State's intransigence. In the following two
years, 2006-2007, the receiver developed a wide-ranging plan to turn
around the prison health care system. The "turn around plan," as it
was called, set out an ambitious schedule to build seven new health
41
centers or hospitals and upgrade facilities at all thirty-three prisons.
Fully implemented, the plan would generate 10,000 new hospital
beds - 5,000 earmarked for medical care and 5,000 for mental
health care.42 The total cost was $8 billion.43 In his presentation,
Clark Kelso acknowledged that this was a large amount of money,
but he suggested that the cost was a testament to how neglectful the
State had been in providing medical care to inmates.4
The State initially expressed a willingness to work with the
receiver on implementing the plan, but it soon became clear that the
39. As Judge Karlton said during his question and answer period at the conference, "I have
not appointed a Receiver, unlike Judge Henderson .... [M]y own judgment is that this is a state
problem. It is the state that has the obligation. The federal court has the obligation to ensure that
the state does its duty." Karlton, supra note 14.
40. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351TEH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8878, at *13
(N.D. Cal. May 10, 2005) (noting defendants have stated that "areas such as budget, personnel,
contracts, procurement, information systems, physical plant, and space issues [] continue to pose
fundamental barriers to compliance.") (internal quotations omitted).
41. Achieving a Constitutional Level of Medical Care in California's Prisons: The Federal
Receiver's Turnaround Plan of Action (Jan. 6, 2008), available at http://www.cprinc.org/
docs/court/ReceiverTumaroundPlan_060608.pdf
42. Id. at 27.
43. Legislative Analyst's Office, Federal Receiver's Prison Health Care Construction
Program, http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis-2009/crimjustice/cjanl09004002.aspx (last visited
Nov. 9, 2009.).
44. Clark Kelso, Receiver, California Prison Health Care Services, Presentation at the
California Correctional Crisis Conference (Mar. 19, 2009).
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State would do all it could to impede reform. For example, in July
2008, the receiver requested the first installment of funds - roughly
$200 million - to begin implementing the turn around plan.45
When the State refused to comply, the receiver filed a motion in
federal court to hold the Governor and State Controller in contempt
of court.4 6  The State responded by filing a motion to terminate the
receivership. It argued, among other things, that the receivership
was unlawful under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). 47
Relations between the receiver and the State reached a low point
at this time. The opening paragraph of the receiver's January 2009
report gave a hint of how tense the situation had become:
During the reporting period, the Governor and Attorney
General... executed a "flip-flop" and "bait and switch."
The immediate victims of the State's turnabout are four
federal district courts and respect for the rule of law; the
ultimate victims are the tens of thousands of class members
who are waiting for constitutionally required improvements
in their medical care as well as the citizens of the State of
California.48
Meanwhile, state officials viciously attacked the receiver. The
Attorney General, for example, declared that the "receivership has
become a government unto itself, operating without accountability,
without public scrutiny and without clear standards., 49 Given these
tensions, Joyce Hayhoe's claim during the conference that "the
45. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 560 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2009). The district court
ultimately ordered the State to turn over $250 million to the receiver. Id.
46. Id. at 980.
47. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, NO. COI-1351 TEH, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23683, at *12
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2009). The motion was denied. Id.
48. CALIFORNIA PRISON HEALTH CARE RECEIVERSHIP, ACHIEVING A CONSTITUTIONAL
LEVEL OF MEDICAL CARE IN CALIFORNIA'S PRISONS: TENTH TRI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
RECEIVER'S TURNAROUND PLAN OF ACTION 1 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at
http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0018-0072.pdf.
49. Michael Rothfeld, Officials Urge End to Prison Oversight, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009,
at BI. The receiver for his part fired back: "In a jab at Brown, who is exploring a run for
governor, Kelso wrote that 'public officials who choose to run their political campaigns for
higher office' by trying to block judges' orders 'actively promote disrespect for the courts."' Id.
Kelso also "took a swipe at Schwarzenegger for reneging on pledges of cooperation, writing that
'court orders are not Hollywood contracts ... where promises are cheaply given and then ignored
when convenient."' Id.
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HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
Department and the Receiver are working well together," was
surprising, to say the least. 50
Any hope that 2009 would result in greater harmony between the
receiver and State has proved to be short-lived. A possible
breakthrough seemed to occur in the spring, when the receiver
agreed to scale back his $8-billion plan. Rather than building 10,000
new beds, the receiver unveiled a new plan to construct only two
hospitals with a capacity of 3,400 inmates. The cost under this
revised plan would drop substantially to $1.9 billion.51 The receiver
also agreed to end efforts to hold the Governor in contempt of court
for failing to provide construction funds. In return, the receiver
demanded that the State provide the required funds and end efforts to
have the receivership terminated.
For a brief moment, the parties seemed to agree. In early
summer 2009, Secretary Matthew Cate and the receiver outlined the
general contours of a plan. The parties agreed to report back to the
court with a full-fledged agreement by the first week in June 2009.
Once again, the State's promises proved empty. As the days passed,
state officials refused to sign off on the agreement. As a result on
June 17, 2009, Judge Karlton called the Governor's lawyers into
court and excoriated them. He told them it was "intolerable" that the
administration has not yet approved the tentative agreement; and
gave them fifteen days to sign the agreement. 52 Karlton also warned
that if the State failed to sign the agreement and also failed to
propose a reasonable, fully-funded alternative: "I'm going to start
eating into their budget in a real dramatic way." 53  The judge
continued, "[t]hose are orders of the court that must be obeyed - not
hoped for, not prayed for - obeyed. I'm not kidding."54
Two weeks later, the State responded by disowning the tentative
agreement. "Schwarzenegger issued a statement saying the State
50. Joyce Hayhoe, Legislation Assistant Secretary, Cal. Dep't of Corr. and Rehab.,
Presentation at the California Correctional Crisis Conference (Mar. 19, 2009).
51. Don Thompson, Judge Sets Deadline for California Prison Decision, VENTURA
COUNTY STAR, June 16, 2009. The cut is not quite as dramatic as it first appears. The original
$8 billion plan was to be spent over ten years. The compromise proposal was to cover anticipated
health care needs for the nextfour years. See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Governor Dumps Plan to Build
Prison Hospitals, S.F. CHRON., June 26, 2009, at Al.
52. Thompson, supra note 51.
53. Id.
54. Id. After collecting himself, the judge seemed to think twice about his words, adding
"Take that back. I'm not threatening anything." Id.
[Vol. 7
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'cannot agree to spend $2 billion on state-of-the-art medical facilities
for prisoners while we are cutting billions of dollars from schools
and health care programs for children and seniors.' 55  Donald
Specter, the lead lawyer for the inmates in Plata, commented, "This
will make the courts have to intervene more, because the state said it
won't do even what Secretary Cate says is necessary .... It shows,
once again. . . a completely dysfunctional system. ' 56
II. The Three-Judge Panel Decision
Patience exhausted, Judges Henderson and Karlton began to
consider an even more extreme remedy: an inmate release order.
Such orders are governed by the PLRA and can only be issued by a
specially appointed three-judge panel. On July 23, 2007, both
Judges Henderson and Karlton moved for the establishment of such a
panel. The district court panel that was convened consisted of three
judges - Judge Karlton, Judge Henderson, and Judge Stephen
Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
A. The Panel's Findings
The trial commenced in November 2008. On February 9, 2009,
the panel issued its preliminary order, announcing its conclusion that
an inmate release order was appropriate. The order was
''preliminary" in order to give the parties time to reach a settlement.
The court encouraged the parties to immediately engage in
settlement negotiations. Those talks, if they ever began, went
nowhere.
Without any settlement possibilities, the court proceeded to issue
its final order on August 4, 2009. 57 The lengthy opinion focused
appropriately on the PLRA's requirements for issuing an inmate
release order. As specified in the statute, the court first found that
crowding was the "primary cause" of the constitutional violations.58
55. Bob Egelko, Prison Hospital Plans Dropped: Governor Backs Away from Deal in
Light of Budget Cuts, S.F. CHRON., June 26, 2009, at Al.
56. Id.
57. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67943, at *394 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009).
58. Id. at *224.
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The court also found that "no other relief' was available that would
remedy the violation in a timely and effective manner.'
9
The court then turned to the question of the scope of the relief.
The PLRA requires that any order "extend no further than necessary
to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or
plaintiffs., 60  After reviewing various evidence and testimony, the
court concluded that the prison population should be capped at
137.5% of design capacity. Based on current population numbers,
that meant approximately 40,000 inmates would need to be
released - more than a quarter of the current prison population. The
court asked the State to come up with a plan to determine which
inmates would be released early.
B. Appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court
The State has declared that it will appeal the inmate release order.
Under the PLRA, appeals from decisions of a three-judge panel are
taken directly to the Supreme Court. Given the importance of the
decision, the expectation is that the Supreme Court will grant review.
Although it is too early to say which specific arguments the State
may assert, three seem particularly likely.
i. The Primary Cause
One approach for the State to take would be to challenge the
court's findings that crowding is the "primary cause" of the
constitutional violations. As the State argued, there are many
different reasons for the constitutional deficiencies, including
inadequate staffing, lack of equipment, poor leadership, and
overcrowding itself. Fixing any one of these problems will not
necessarily ensure that the prison health care system is
constitutionally adequate. If that is the case, then on what basis can
one say that overcrowding is the primary cause of the constitutional
violations? The State will surely argue that crowding is only one of
many causes, not a "primary" cause.
59. Id. at *232.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
61. Coleman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67943, at *268.
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On the other hand, plaintiffs have a reasonable argument why
crowding is the "primary" cause of the constitutional shortcomings.
A primary factor might be viewed as the factor which, if rectified,
would move the prison system farthest towards constitutionally
adequate levels. In this light, the court's finding that crowding is the
primary factor makes sense.
As the court pointed out, addressing the crowding problem would
lead to immediate and significant gains across the board -
improving living conditions, staffing, supplies; it would move the
system dramatically toward the constitutional minimum. 6
2
Addressing other factors instead - such as the inadequate staffing or
insufficient supplies - would fail to provide comparable benefits (at
least without addressing the crowding problem as well).63
ii. Reasonable Time for Alternative Remedies to Work
Another argument the State might raise focuses on the haste with
which the three-judge panel moved to consider an inmate release
order. According to this line of attack, the court should have given
the receiver more time to remedy the constitutional violations.
Indeed, the PLRA, itself, requires the court to try alternative
remedies first, and to give the State a "reasonable amount of time to
comply" with those previous court orders.
The receiver was appointed in 2006, but within eighteen months
the federal courts had called for a three judge panel to determine
whether an inmate release order was necessary. All parties appear to
agree that the receiver has made significant improvements in the
prison medical system already. The State's position has been that the
receiver can bring the system into constitutional compliance without
an inmate release order.
This argument is superficially appealing, but it faces serious
obstacles. As an initial matter, the receiver himself has argued that
overcrowding pervades the system and undermines his reform
62. Id. at*141-42.
63. Moreover, the State's interpretation of "primary cause" could prevent the courts from
adopting remedies necessary to correct the constitutional violations. Such an interpretation would
likely pose serious constitutional problems. That was the view, as well, of Associate Attorney
General John Schmidt, who testified in the Senate on a precursor to the PLRA. Prison Reform:
Enhancing the Effectiveness of Incarceration: Hearing on S. 104-573 Before the S. Comm. On the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 13 (1995).
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plans. 64  Moreover, the State has repeatedly put up roadblocks in
front of the receiver's remedial efforts. Donald Specter offered an
illustration during his presentation at the conference. The State had
argued before the panel that an inmate release order was
inappropriate because the receiver was on the job and making
improvements. However, as Specter observed, "before we could
finish the argument in the case, [the State's attorneys] went to court
to get rid of [the receiver]." 65
In a similar vein, the State has consistently refused to give the
receiver the resources needed to improve the prison medical system.
It has refused to provide the $8 billion the receiver said was
necessary to bring the medical system up to constitutional standards.
Even after the receiver reduced his proposal to less than $2 billion,
the State refused to sign off on the agreement.
Finally, even if the State were to come up with the funds
demanded by the receiver, it would take years for the proposed
building plan to be completed. Given the State's repeated efforts to
block the receiver's work, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
State has been given more than enough time to demonstrate its
willingness to work with the receiver.
iii. The Size of the Release
A third challenge focuses on the size of the inmate release order.
The State will no doubt argue that a population cap at 137.5% of
design capacity is too extreme. The problem with this argument on
appeal is that the State failed to offer persuasive evidence at trial
demonstrating that a significantly smaller inmate release order would
be sufficient to address the constitutional violations.
In its opinion, the panel worked methodically through the
evidence presented. The panel began by acknowledging that a good
argument could be made that the prison population should be limited
64. See, e.g., Coleman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67943, at *247 ("The Plata Receiver has
determined that adequate care cannot be provided for the current number of inmates at existing
prisons and that additional capacity is required to remedy the medical care deficiencies that exist
in California's prison system.").
65. Specter, supra note 11.
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to the design capacity itself.66 Nonetheless, because the plaintiffs
themselves only sought a population cap at 130% of design capacity,
the court determined this was the lowest level it would consider.
67
At the same time, the court cited some evidence that a population
cap of up to 145% might be sufficient. The court referred to a report
by the Corrections Independent Review Panel, which concluded in
2004 "that the California prison system's 'operable capacity' was
145% of its design capacity.' ' 68 The court observed that the
"[p]anel's estimate was prepared by a group of experienced
California prison wardens, who suggested that a system operating at
145% design capacity could 'support full inmate programming in a
safe and secure environment."' 6  Nonetheless, the court also found
problems with the 145% estimate, noting that the number focused on
the ability of the facilities to provide "educational, vocational,
substance abuse, and other rehabilitation programming," but "did not
account for programming associated with mental health or medical
treatment .... When mental health treatment needs are taken into
account, the maximum operable capacity will be lower.",
70
Given these considerations, the court concluded that the
limit on California's
prison population should be somewhat higher than 130% but
lower than 145%. Rather than adopting the 130% limit
requested by plaintiffs, we will out of caution require a
reduction in the population of California's adult prison
institutions to only 137.5% of their combined design capacity
- a population reduction halfway between the cap requested
by plaintiffs and the wardens' estimate of the California
prison system's maximum operable capacity absent
consideration of the need for medical and mental health
care.71
66. Coleman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67943, at *278 ("[T]he evidence at trial demonstrated
that even a prison system operating at or near only 100% design capacity faces serious difficulties
in providing inmates with constitutionally sufficient medical and mental health care.").
67. In support of the 130% number, plaintiffs relied on a report by the State's own advisors,
indicating "the prison system's population should not exceed 130% design capacity, the federal
standard for prison overcrowding." Id. at *284.
68. Id. at *285-86.
69. Id. at *286.
70. Id. at *287.
71. Id. at *290.
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The court's split-the-difference analysis seems arbitrary, and the
State will no doubt argue that this undermines it validity.
Nonetheless, this is unlikely to be a successful argument for
overturning the court's remedial order. Courts typically have a
significant degree of discretion in choosing appropriate remedies,
and line-drawing is inevitable in these cases. Moreover, the court's
decision to narrow the remedy to the range of 130-145% seems
reasonable, and the Supreme Court is unlikely to reverse the ruling
simply because it disagrees with the precise number chosen within
that range.
Concluding Thoughts
The litigation in Plata v. Schwarzenegger brings into sharp focus
the grossly deficient medical care in California's prison system. Yet,
as Clark Kelso pointed out in his presentation, substandard health
care is just the canary in the coalmine, the most obvious sign of a
system that largely neglects the treatment and care of offenders.
72
Several studies have pointed out that California's prisons are
deficient in a range of useful programs and support services,
including education programs, drug treatment services, and
vocational training. 73
What explains this sorry situation? Over the last decade, the
CDCR has been led by a number of well-meaning and highly
competent Secretaries. And yet the agency has proved itself entirely
incapable or unwilling to make the kinds of dramatic changes needed
to improve prison conditions. Why?
Conference participants mentioned several possible answers.
Donald Specter, in his presentation, noted that services, like health
care, are not a "core competency" of CDCR.74 Prisons are typically
quite good at custody decisions; however, medical care is, as Specter
puts it, an "add on." 75  Judges Henderson and Karlton identified
72. Kelso, supra note 44.
73. See, e.g., JOAN PETERSILIA, UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS 39-44
(2006); LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA'S CORRECTIONAL CRISIS: TIME IS
RUNNING OUT 24-5 (2007) (discussing lack of "education programs, job training, and substance
abuse treatment programs).
74. Specter, supra note 11.
75. Id.
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another problem, which they called "trained incapacity," a form of
bureaucratic inertia that ensures prison officials will resist any
serious reform efforts. 
76
Both factors make it difficult for even motivated prison
administrators to make widespread reforms. But these elements only
touch on the surface of the problems. An even more fundamental
obstacle is that many of the key levers of control over the prison
system are beyond the Secretary's authority. Any effort to improve
prison conditions, build staff, and expand rehabilitation services
requires either an increase in funding or a reduction in the number of
inmates. Either change requires legislative authorization.
With CDCR officials stymied, the judiciary has become the
remedy of last resort. And, in fact, federal courts have achieved
substantial success. The orders generated in the Plata and Coleman
litigation have improved prison conditions, and the three judge
panel's decision will improve things further (assuming it is upheld on
appeal). Nonetheless, as many of the participants in the litigation
recognize, judicial intervention is not a panacea for the problems that
plague the prison system.
The CDCR's resistance to reform will make it difficult for the
federal courts to remedy serious constitutional violations, as the
Plata and Coleman litigation make clear. Judge Henderson observed
that, for any progress to be made, the judiciary must engage
aggressively and continually. 7  But even an engaged and forceful
judiciary will face significant obstacles to reform.
76. As Judge Henderson notes:
'Trained incapacity' refers to a situation in which erecting barriers to change
becomes an ingrained means of self-preservation for bureaucrats, so that, when
serious institutional problems threaten or challenge the bureaucracy - or require
it to bend or flex - we find that those within the institution have actually trained
themselves to be incapable of responding.
Henderson, supra note 34, at 7. Judge Karlton explains one way trained incapacity develops:
Like any large bureaucracy, it [the prison administration] has put in place a series
of rules designed to insure that subordinates do their job. The problem is that the
rules become a justification for both conduct and a failure to act. If the rule does
not precisely address an issue, there is, in the minds of those who are subject to
the rules, no conduct required or indeed permitted. In a real sense the rules
become a justification for the status quo - no matter how inadequate the status
quo might be. I think that one problem is the belief, present in any large
bureaucracy, that you can't be criticized for following the book.
Karlton, supra note 14.
77. In reflecting on his role, Judge Henderson observed:
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The judiciary does not have free reign to order additional taxes
for hospital construction.78 That is why plaintiffs in the Plata and
Coleman litigation sought to obtain funding for hospital construction
by redirecting funding previously authorized for prison building
projects. Even where permitted, courts are extremely hesitant to raid
the treasury to pay for prison services, recognizing that such steps
would prove very controversial.
Of course, the court has legal authority under the PLRA to order
inmates released. But even this remedy is problematic as a long term
solution. A prison release order can be met by identifying certain
classes of offenders who deserve release. But long-term reform
requires a comprehensive reform of the sentencing system, an effort
that is far beyond the competence of the judiciary. 79 Again, without
legislative support, the effort to reduce the prison population over the
long run will likely fail.8°
Finally, beyond these difficulties, the court simply lacks the
authority to make certain kinds of necessary reforms. The court's
power, after all, is linked to its authority to remedy constitutional
violations. So even where constitutional violations have been
identified - as in the health care area - judicial relief will not
accomplish anything more than the constitutionally minimum level
of care. Moreover, some deficiencies in the prison system do not
implicate constitutional rights. For example, increased educational
programs or vocational training may be beneficial on both policy and
moral grounds. But it is doubtful that offenders have a constitutional
[I]t struck me just how attentive, just how "active," a judge must be to serve as an
effective catalyst for change in the context of prison litigation. Some might even
suggest that being so very "active" makes one an "activist" judge, with all the
pejorative overtones associated with that term. However, judges should take an
active role to induce defendants to comply with their constitutional obligations,
and that does not make an activist judge. Being actively involved is simply a
necessary element of discharging the court's obligation to uphold and enforce the
rights so carefully guaranteed by our Constitution.
Henderson, supra note 34, at 11-12.
78. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990); DAVID I. LEVINE, DAVID J. JUNG & TRACY A.
THOMAS, REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 376-414 (5th ed. West Group 2009).
79. See Aaron Rappaport, Sentencing Reform in California, 7 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J.
(this issue, Winter 2010).
80. Karlton, supra note 14 ("[I]t should be kept in mind that the federal courts' role is
circumscribed by our jurisdiction. We do not have a writ to solve all problems, but solely may
act relative to state prisons only when the federal constitution has been breached.").
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right to either. Only the legislature can make the necessary changes
to adopt worthy, but not constitutionally mandated, changes.
A judicial solution seems to be only a partial answer, and one
that is not entirely satisfactory. Ultimately, the only long-term
solution is the one least likely to occur in the foreseeable future: a
legislative solution. The legislature alone has the power to make the
necessary reforms in the prison system - increasing funding,
changing sentencing laws, pressuring prison officials. However, few
are optimistic that the legislature will take the lead on these fronts.
Legislators have little incentive to improve prison conditions, and
quite a bit of incentive not to make improvements. Improving prison
conditions costs money that can be used for more popular programs.
Furthermore, prisoners do not represent a significant voting block,
and the appearance of being soft on crime can end a political career.
It is little wonder that the legislature has failed to make prison reform
a priority.
With the legislature, judiciary, and prison bureaucracy ill-
equipped to remedy prison conditions, the prospects for long term
reform of the prison system seem bleak. Judge Karlton, in his
luncheon speech, declared that, "[w]hat is desperately needed is a
change in our culture." He added regretfully, this is a "need for
which I see little to suggest movement.,
81
Judge Karlton is certainly correct that the public's view of
criminals is unlikely to change dramatically in the near future. But
small steps can be taken now to counter the worst tendencies of the
system and to the lay the groundwork for more significant changes
later. Perhaps the most fundamental need right now is to start to shift
the public's thinking about the overriding purpose of the punishment
system.
Thinking about punishment in a reflective and reasoned manner
is difficult to do. Citizens have gut-level responses to crime, often
driven by feelings of fear and anger. Those emotions lead us to
respond to crime in a passionate, often vengeful way, rather than in
the calm and thoughtful manner punishment decisions require.
Reforming our correctional policies thus requires us to move towards
a more principled basis for our penal policies. But what principle
should guide deliberations?
81. Id.
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Since the movement towards determinate sentencing began in the
late 70s, retribution (or "just deserts") has been the dominant purpose
of punishment. But just deserts allows each citizen's intuition to
serve as the basis for the sanction in any criminal case, and so places
no limits on what an individual thinks is just punishment. A far
more appealing principle is a utilitarian rationale, with public safety
being the overriding goal of the punishment system.
If such a principle were embraced, criminal policy would shift
from expressing citizens' emotional response to crime, towards a
more nuanced assessment of policy. The focus would be on
determining which sanctions work, and at what cost. This approach
would emphasize the need for a careful tallying of costs and benefits
of criminal punishments. My hunch is that such an assessment would
indicate that in many cases we have overstated the benefits of prison,
while ignoring its enormous fiscal and human costs.
One notable effect of the State's fiscal crisis has been to bring
into sharp relief the financial costs of incarceration, and to encourage
renewed scrutiny of the way we allocate our correctional resources.
But in addition to fiscal costs, we need a fuller understanding of the
enormous human costs - costs in terms of lost human capacity and
devastated communities. This is not an argument for eliminating
prison; it is an argument for being smart about prisons, for reserving
prisons for those situations where the benefits clearly outweigh the
costs.
The challenge ultimately is to find ways to persuade the
public - and ultimately policymakers - to adopt public safety as
the guiding (and limiting) principle. To succeed in this endeavor, a
range of actors - journalists, judges, academics, public interest
groups - need to work together to educate the public on the
importance of embracing a utilitarian model of corrections.
Sympathetic policymakers, in turn, should seek to modify the State's
penal code - which currently lists "punishment" as the overriding
goal - to emphasize the importance of public safety objectives.
With that guiding principle in place, the way forward becomes
clearer. For example, it highlights the need for the State to beef-up
its ability to gather data and conduct research on crime policies. Only
then can policymakers reach intelligent, evidence-based conclusions
about the effectiveness of its penal sanctions and rehabilitation
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programs. Only then can we have some comfort that the benefits of
a given approach outweigh its costs.
A public safety rationale might also encourage the State to
consider innovative institutional arrangements regarding penal
policy. For instance, a strong argument can be made that criminal
policy should be insulated to some degree from the political realm,
which is too often influenced by emotions inflamed by the latest
crime of the day. The establishment of an independent sentencing
commission is one method that has been proposed to insulate
sentencing policy from politics, and hopefully ensure that decisions
are made with a long-term perspective, rather than with short-term
political goals, in mind.
Plainly, these changes will not be easy to implement. They will
require a broad-based effort to shift correctional policy towards
public safety concerns. In the end, identifying an overriding purpose
of punishment is an essential step. A clear, principled objective for
penal policy will offer a blueprint for reform, and hopefully will
serve as a catalyst for a revitalized criminal justice system.
Winter 20 101
284 HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7
